Showing posts with label knowledge. Show all posts
Showing posts with label knowledge. Show all posts

Sunday, January 9, 2011

On practical decision-making once again

While I concede that I may not, in fact, know anything at all -- and that my senses cannot be used to validate themselves -- beyond this initial concession of potential ignorance, I will still pragmatically make decisions as though they are the best -- even in the absence of absolute evidence in my favor, or a way of absolutely verifying the integrity of my actions. For example, I can claim that my senses appear to indicate that there is no god, or that suffering is valuable, without knowing these things for certain, because, by living, I appear to be continuously acting, and my senses give me "leads" of potential validity. You can claim that my lack of certainty precludes my justifying any action -- and that, consequently, all actions are equally invalid, capable of being chosen at random based on no metric of value whatsoever -- but do you really practice this? Of course not, as it's impossible to be sentient while doing so, unless schizophrenic, psychopathic, et al.

Let's use a less abstract, practical example, instead of god or suffering: A plane in the midst of crashing is headed right for where you're standing. You may not know for certain that the plane will crash into you and kill you, but that does not make the idea that you will survive, or that the plane doesn't actually exist, somehow equally as justifiable as the idea that it's best to move out of the way. It's okay to concede that you don't really know whether it's best to get out of the way while still getting out of the way, and no one would really do otherwise outside of some useless, abstract world of irrelevant philosophizing. For as long as you live, there is no such thing as "not choosing." Further, while it's certainly possible that standing still and getting out of the way are equally valid in this scenario, no one would ever act at random upon realizing this, making it completely irrelevant to our lives.

The opposite approach -- certainty of belief -- is a fundamental cause of human conflict, for it promotes static systems, and denies the process of scientific refinement, or the prospect of being in error. It doesn't matter whether the generalization-borne conflict in question is the Holocaust, an argument between you and your girlfriend, or someone rolling their eyes at a creationist for "not knowing what they're talking about"; it's the same exact error in every instance.

Furthermore, the idea that nothing is justifiable is itself something implicitly justified by the senses, and is thus a statement of absolute certainty lacking in any kind of solid basis whatsoever. When asked how they know that no action can ultimately be justified, proponents of this view will simply respond, "Because they don't appear justifiable." In what way is appearance ever justifiable, other than as a potential lead? How do you know that nothing can be known, and if you can't know this, then why should our senses and absolutely nothing be put on equal grounds? Finally, how do all actions not appear justifiable? From what are we deriving this conclusion? Plenty of actions appear perfectly justifiable to me, given variable constraints, problem scope, etc.; if you disagree, then this is where some form of scientific consensus via repetition and peer review comes into play.

The realm of sensory data and and its interpretors may be limiting, but we are enslaved by it, whether we like it or not.

Saturday, December 4, 2010

A quick rumination on decision-making

1. When living, you are necessarily always acting.

2. In scenarios and cases involving decision-making, deciding not to act is not only a decision, it's an action -- if only a negative one.

3. By living, we are slaves to physics.

4. We can choose to what we are slaves, in some cases. If we must be enslaved, then logic currently appears to be a suitable master.

5. Even if we concede that relying on our senses to conclude that our senses are reliable is nonsensical, we still necessarily act on our senses continuously by merely existing.

6. Therefore, we must always act as though we believe that a given option is the most logical, even if we have no idea one way or the other, because "not acting" is still acting, and is often less logical than some other option. Note: This refers to instances in which one action appears more logical than the others -- not instances in which we don't even have leads derived from sensory input.

This illustrates the necessity of pragmatic action in life; just because I am humble and possess a finite, relative perspective of the world does not mean that I cannot make decisions to improve reality. I don't have to believe anything to be true in order to act as though I do. Furthermore, because action is an inevitable by-product of existing, that which is perceived as the most logical out of all potential actions will come to be the logical action, while all other actions, in spite of occupying a gradient of degrees of logicality, will come to all be illogical actions. This is because, even though these latter actions differ in to what extent they are logical, they all share the quality of having not been chosen.

Note, also, that my supposition that relying on my senses to conclude that my senses are reliable is nonsensical is itself relying on my senses, as is this very statement. In other words, there is an infinite regress of assumption that must necessarily be made in order to exist as an intelligent organism, so whether something is true is entirely irrelevant to how much work we should put into implementing it in our daily lives.