It's about psychology. Our psychological dispositions are each composed of an array of complex experiential data derived from various constituents of sentience, including sensation deprivation (desire), fear, mental sensation (emotions), physical sensation, visual sensation, auditory sensation, olfactory sensation (smell), thermal sensation, balance sensation, and gustatory sensation (taste). These constituents are, as part of a continual process of psychological development, the root cause of all destructive tendencies inherent in sentient organisms, from preferring junk food to healthy food to falling in love with a person who's wrong for us to selfishly favoring those whom we have feelings for over others. They're also all fundamentally negative by design, and stem from an imposed, baseline state of discomfort which can only be relieved by death; furthermore, discomfort is imposed by unintelligent physical forces for the ultimate goal of preparation for genetic reproduction, and nothing more.
With this in mind, it should be quite obvious that sensation is the only physical quality which possesses de facto value in the universe -- until proven otherwise, that is. Therefore, the reduction of its adverse effects should be a prime directive of our civilization, not only in localized instances, but also where the continual, unregulated creation of new sentient life occurs.
Conclusion: Human psychology is not a prerequisite for logic to run as a process on sufficiently capable systems. Furthermore, in being so frequently prone to corruption, human psychology actually hinders the advancement of logic everywhere that it exists alongside that mechanism; in fact, the sheer intensity of subjective sensation as perceived by organic memory stores makes it an extremely effective motivator for individual, multicellular organisms; thus, it retards the logical process of improving reality, as the more effective it is for individuals, the less effective it ultimately is for sensation as a phenomenon. In other words, the required immediacy of action of an organism in dire situations precludes the possibility of practical, comparative analysis being carried out while free from intervention in the form of emotional and physical biases.
I don't want a balance between emotion and logic; I want the outright elimination of all that is negative -- and thus, valuable -- in the universe, and will continue to want this until it is demonstrated that other forms of value exist outside the realm of chemical-based sensation.
A de facto value until proven otherwise? Sounds all to reminiscent of an oft committed logical fallacy in theistic discussions. How did you make the leap from the existence of experience to the existence of value in experience? You seem to have replicated the same flawed logic of people ignorant of the is-ought problem. If I claimed on the contrary that there is no value to be had in experience, how would you disprove me? The answer is, of course, that you couldn't. The only way value can exist is by assuming it into existence.
ReplyDeleteI made no such leap, because I do not maintain that I know anything with any degree of certainty. All assumptions are equally unjustifiable for their reliance on an infinite regress of sensory information; in other words, if I state that I know something to be true, I'm doing so based on my senses -- at least, that's what I think, but I can't know THAT, either -- or THIS, ad infinitum.
ReplyDeleteOnce you realize this, it becomes evident that humans are incapable of comprehending the lofty nature of knowledge, and should thus use some other metric -- namely, appearance of knowledge -- in its place. A quick qualitative comparison between sensation and all other extant phenomena in the universe leads to a practical decision to act AS THOUGH I "believe" that an appearance of value exists in sensation, even though I can't know this for certain. Everything that we do, whether we pretend like there's a such thing as non-action or not, is rooted in making comparisons between abstractions.
You have to make decisions in life -- even if it's to refrain from doing something, or to "not act"; if this isn't the case, then you're no longer alive. For example, if I claim that I don't KNOW that not showing up for work for a month will get me fired, I also don't KNOW the consequences of the alternative actions, so if they're all equally unjustifiable, and if I'm alive, then I'm being forced to take one of them whether I like it or not.
It's a de facto action, because rocks don't APPEAR as valuable as humans, for example. In any case, when I say that a negative sensation is bad, I shouldn't have to justify my statement for the same reasons that I shouldn't have to justify my statement that circles are round -- both statements are inherent in the definitions of their respective words. If you disagree, then you'll have to redefine "negative sensation," or convince me that some other standard of value is superior to that of the instinctive reactions facilitated by nervous systems.
[continued] I am unable to "disprove" any assertion made by you that there is no value in experience, because I am unable to "disprove" ANY assertion that you or anyone else makes. However, I can play my role as someone who "believes" things out of practical necessity, because, by living, I appear to be continuously acting, and should therefore act in ways that are relatively superior to their alternatives -- even if I'm not certain of the authenticity of my actions. Humans create value systems by merely existing; therefore, even where nothing appears certain, the definition of value will arise, if only implicitly. Doesn't it make more sense, then, to define it explicitly based on logic? How is your objection different from any objection to claims that what our senses tell us is accurate? Why don't you make similarly pedantic objections to claims that we shouldn't jump off cliffs? Conceding potential ignorance does not somehow eradicate the need to make decisions.
ReplyDeleteUpon rereading, it seems the comment I left was inadvertently unclear as to its original underlying intent. What I referred to in my post were not the first order claims into what is, or at that least what people tend to claim to be valuable. I don't deny that agents typically act based on values they assign to any range of phenomena and then use those values as a means of organising their actions. I don't even deny that I value things and act in accordance with those values. Rather, implicit in my argument was a second order claim about the nature of those first order values; in particular, that all values are devoid of any meaning or significance and that no action is ultimately any more preferable than any other. I regard this as an obvious artefact of logical thought processes. Reasoning is based upon axioms and the statements that follow from them. Values can similarly be regarded as a type of axiom and from this, it should be clear why the preferability of any value is unprovable. The suggestion that something can have the rather nebulous notion of the “appearance” of value merely shifts the goalposts.
ReplyDeleteOn negative sensations, in my mind this term refers simply to those qualia to which sentients are averse. To take it a step further and claim that negative experiences are bad is to make that same axiomatic value judgement.
As a side note, I'll also point out that value systems are not a necessary feature of one's existence. If one's actions were completely random then there wouldn't be any underlying principles to govern their behaviour and subsequently, that agent could appropriately be characterised as valueless.
So, you see merit in at least acting based on values in some contexts, but view all such values as "meaningless"? How can something be devoid of significance if it is opted for over its competitors? Doesn't that, by definition, make it significant? I don't interrupt conversations by stating that circles might have four sides or that dogs might have elephant trunks, because words are fabrications for describing the appearance of reality, and thus refer to concepts rather than physical objects; negative and positive value are no exceptions to this rule of definition, so stating that values lack meaning is akin to stating that values aren't values at all.
ReplyDeleteFurther, how are values exempted from justification, while most other forms of action are not? What makes thinking that throwing a glass object against a wall will not cause it to smash into pieces any less justified than thinking that your values are devoid of meaning? Whether we're talking values or something else (the cause/effect nature of actions and their corresponding outcomes, in this case), we are always forced to make a decision, and always do so based on what we think makes that decision more "right" than its competitors. If deciding to NOT think that a glass object will remain in tact after being hurled against a brick wall makes more sense than the competing notions -- and this is true of any scenario involving options and future actions -- then I fail to see why value is excepted from this rule.
I suppose that you could claim that nothing means anything, but everything appears to mean something, so I don't know how one would even begin to justify such a statement. For instance, yawning MEANS that I'm tired, and the presence of ice in a given environment MEANS that it's cold there. Perhaps this meaning is an illusion as well, but in order to make an authoritative assertion of that nature, one would require some standard against which to test the assertion, and I don't know how one would acquire such a thing while existing in this universe. I'll leave the possibility open, as I do with anything, but that certainly doesn't mean that I would make the positive claim that every abstracted quality or quantity is inherently devoid of meaning.
Certain actions appear meaningful or logical to me -- or, at least, moreso than the alternatives -- so, in spite of my ignorance regarding the accuracy or authenticity of these sensation-based appearances, given that I am alive (another presumption, technically), I must at least "pretend" that they are meaningful or logical -- for practical purposes only.
I could claim that this was a meaningless waste of time, but then I'd necessarily have to find meaning in the assertion that the actions were meaningless! Instead, I profess the possibility of ignorance, then live.
On your latter points:
ReplyDeleteI would never make moral claims regarding negative sensations. I think that things have value; further, I think that value is meaningful. However, I don't think that anything is innately "good" or "bad" from a moral standpoint -- just that some actions are more logical than others, given context, conditions, and a value equation. By definition, a negative sensation holds negative value, but that shouldn't imply that one should be punished, looked down upon, etc. for perpetrating an "immoral" act that leads to an instance of negative sensation -- especially if such a sensation tips the value equation in the favor of valuelessness. We don't have to think, individually, that bad sensations are bad in order for our nervous systems to "communicate" with the external world in such binary ways, however; it just so happens that these binary reactions appear more meaningful than everything surrounding them.
Also, I don't know how randomness could be possible in a deterministic universe, nor do I think it's possible for someone to completely forsake decision-making processes and act erratically. Something less than intelligent and/or sentient might be able to, sure, but not humans.
To conclude on this: "How can something be devoid of significance if it is opted for over its competitors? Doesn't that, by definition, make it significant?"
ReplyDeleteWhere two options are of equal value, they're not competitors; they share the same quality that enables them to produce favorable ends. I am referring not to physical objects but to their attributes and qualities -- even if the qualities are as vague as "good" and "bad." For example, if I love two kinds of foods equally and can't make up my mind about which to eat, it's not that the foods are competing; it's that "delicious food" has been selected BEFORE I got to the point of making that second decision. Flipping a coin to determine which I'll eat would be acceptable, then, but this would not negate the existence of a literally infinite array of inferior alternatives, including eating feces, jumping in front of a truck, etc.
Something merely having being opted for in favour of something else isn't sufficient to instil meaning in the case where the decision was arbitrary. Regardless, I feel that an informal syllogism is in order if only for the sake of focus.
ReplyDelete1. Reason is incapable of deducing non-arbitrary human values.
2. No choice is ultimately any more preferable than any other.
3. No values exist or can exist a priori.
4. The claim that there exists de facto value in experience is false.
But I'm not sure precisely with which of these points you disagree.
I never claimed that other forms of action were exempt from justification and indeed never would. The same reasoning I used to attack the meaning of value could equally be used against empirical claims. Fundamentally, there's no difference between the claim that 'the Earth orbits around the Sun' and 'rape is wrong'. Both are predicated upon axioms which could be rejected or dismissed in favour of any others for any reason whatsoever. I suspect the reason that people perceive there to be a metaphysical difference between these claims lies in their own psychology. The human brain develops in response to physical stimuli and in turn comes to make sense of these. It should therefore be unsurprising that claims about the reality from which the brain developed 'appear' to contain so much truth which contrasts to values which have no analogous grounding. Even though claims about reality often seem to have some air of inconvertibility, they all must rest upon axioms which can't contain justification. This allows us to deny the meaning of any statement by denying those axioms.
Additionally, claiming or pretending that some action is logical is rather different than some action actually being logical. Moreover, acting for so-called 'practical purposes' presupposes value in acting practically. Why is pragmatism preferable to impragmatism?
The implicit contradiction in the statement that “everything is meaningless” says more about the system of thought under which the statement was made then the statement itself. If it was found that there's no meaning in any propositions under a given system, then the system undermines itself and won't be able to find meaning in meta-statements about itself.
I roughly agree with your analysis of morality but I'd point out that in your initial post you purported there to be negative value in negative experience and furthermore that civilisation should minimise negative experience; the moral claim that led me to take up argument in the first place.
Randomness can exist in a deterministic universe whenever its initial state was random. In this case everything that happens within that universe is reducible to some initial random state and so every further occurrence can be viewed in some sense as being random. Quantum mechanics also suggests that this universe isn't deterministic anyway. But this is peripheral to the point I was originally trying to make. If values are an innate part of existence then there should be some formal logical deduction demonstrating this to be the case. However, even in a deterministic universe, I suspect one would struggle to show that whatever led to a given decision was indeed a value.
As for your final paragraph, I wasn't just considering the final two options all those possible. Here, my contention would be that there's no way to preferentially distinguish between all possible choices of consumables and thus that there would be no significance in whatever choice was made.
"Something merely having being opted for in favour of something else isn't sufficient to instil meaning in the case where the decision was arbitrary."
ReplyDeleteWhile all objectified abstractions are ultimately arbitrary, nervous systems are incapable of understanding this.
"Both are predicated upon axioms which could be rejected or dismissed in favour of any others for any reason whatsoever."
The veracity/integrity/practicality of an action and the possibility of an action are two different things; many things are possible, but that doesn't make them acceptable. Sure, the universe as a whole finds no value in any of them, but, in my mind, it appears that we are forced to do so by simply being sentient. You seem to agree, but you also seem hung up on the fact that the universe doesn't care about these values, and that more than one set of values can exist concurrently. I fail to see why any of this is relevant to process management, improving functionality, etc.
"Even though claims about reality often seem to have some air of inconvertibility, they all must rest upon axioms which can't contain justification. This allows us to deny the meaning of any statement by denying those axioms."
Yes, but our denial would be equally unjustified, also subject to those same axioms.
"Additionally, claiming or pretending that some action is logical is rather different than some action actually being logical. Moreover, acting for so-called 'practical purposes' presupposes value in acting practically. Why is pragmatism preferable to impragmatism?"
I don't really know if it is or not, but it appears as though nervous systems -- most especially my own -- find certain stimuli to be unpleasant. Given that I have no basis for any claim that I ever make (including this claim itself), I'd rather disregard the problem of truth and knowledge for the time being, and instead "play" reality based on the metric of value that appears most fundamental and meaningful to me.
"I roughly agree with your analysis of morality but I'd point out that in your initial post you purported there to be negative value in negative experience and furthermore that civilisation should minimise negative experience; the moral claim that led me to take up argument in the first place."
I would like to see it happen, and think that it will alleviate the only thing that appears to matter to any facet of my biological self, but I make no claims as regards the objective or subjective nature of such a global directive.
As far as I know, no quantum physicist actually positively claims that there is randomness to reality -- merely that the math fits this interpretation. Given that quantum activity occurs on a scale that is immensely counterintuitive, I think it likely that we are not accounting for all of the involved variables therein.
Shorter version: While I also lack a belief in meaning or value (in the sense of "weak" atheists lacking a belief in god), I simultaneously lack a belief in there being NO meaning or value, so my lack of belief says nothing about whether I decide to test the claims in life or not. This doesn't make my actions "right" -- it just causes me to take them, and to challenge antithetical ones taken by others.
ReplyDeleteAs for your four points, I don't think that I know one way or the other whether they are true for the same reasons that I don't think that I know anything for certain.
“While all objectified abstractions are ultimately arbitrary, nervous systems are incapable of understanding this.”
ReplyDeleteI'm not arguing that nervous systems don't respond predictably to a range of external stimuli, I'm arguing that there's no way to logically distinguish between using them as a basis for further action or to not.
“The veracity/integrity/practicality of an action and the possibility of an action are two different things; many things are possible, but that doesn't make them acceptable.”
The acceptability and possibility of two things are both described by propositions and fundamentally, there's no difference between a proposition that describes some property of the universe and one that describes the acceptability of an action in the universe. All of this is relevant to the problem of what to do because it questions whether we should be doing anything in the first place.
“Yes, but our denial would be equally unjustified, also subject to those same axioms.”
But the validity of the denial of meaning of propositions isn't subject to those axioms for the denial itself precipitated out of rejecting those axioms. But regardless, this objection does nothing to support such assertions that “fire is hot” is any more metaphysically valid than its opposing claim. If both statements are equally meaningful, than in my mind, neither statement is meaningful at all.
“Given that I have no basis for any claim that I ever make (including this claim itself), I'd rather disregard the problem of truth and knowledge for the time being, and instead "play" reality based on the metric of value that appears most fundamental and meaningful to me.”
Perhaps this describes the fundamental difference between our worldviews. When I encounter the fundamental failure of epistemology, it's not enough to simply cast it aside simply because it's convenient to do so. If no action can ever be justified then any hope of ever being able to answer the question “what should I do?” is effectively snuffed out which intimately affects my position.
Regarding your earlier contention that my position was genetically motivated, did it not occur to you that the extent to which mine is as such, yours is much more so? This 'appearance of value' of which you speak only exists because of the specific way humans have evolved to live and to see the universe around them. What you've said here could very well be used to undermine other ideas you've attacked in your previous posts, hedonism in particular.
“As far as I know, no quantum physicist actually positively claims that there is randomness to reality -- merely that the math fits this interpretation.”
What does it mean for the universe to be random other than to fit such a mathematical description? And as far as quantum physicists are concerned, many adhere to the Copenhagen interpretation of QM which precisely states that the wavefunction collapse is both an actual reality and is inherently random. Also, I'll note that as per Bell's theorem, no theory of hidden variables can account for all the predictions of quantum mechanics. While this doesn't categorically rule out determinism in the universe, it certainly doesn't help its cause.
"I'm not arguing that nervous systems don't respond predictably to a range of external stimuli, I'm arguing that there's no way to logically distinguish between using them as a basis for further action or to not."
ReplyDeleteIt doesn't matter whether you're absolutely certain that your decision is the most logical or not; your speculation is enough to warrant the decision. I don't know for certain that a glass object will shatter into pieces when thrown against a brick wall -- and, sure, it's not "wrong" to actually believe that a glass object will survive such an impact -- but making that claim isn't in the interest of anything with the capacity to experience -- or, at least, doesn't appear to be, given our finite scope of reality.
It may not be ultimately true that avoiding uncomfortable stimuli is a good thing, but it may not ultimately be true that the inverse is a good thing, either. Once this initial concession passes, the next logical step is to keep the concession in your periphery while entering "everyday, practical decision-making" mode.
Example: "Alright, maybe we don't know for sure that this glass object is going to smash into pieces when thrown with enough force into that brick wall. If, for some reason, an indication to the contrary can be logically deduced with any reasonable degree of certainty -- i.e., it can be affirmed by some objective standard -- then we'll change course; in the meantime, our senses are telling us that, traditionally, what has been described is exactly what happens to glass objects in scenarios like this one, per the laws of physics. We have to go with one option or the other; neither appears right or wrong for the time being, but we are sentient beings, and so we will opt on the side of that by which we are enslaved -- sensory data."
In the scenario above, the visual sense is being used in an intuitive way to arrive at potential epistemic conclusions -- though the question of whether we can actually conclude with regard to anything is complex, and more or less incomprehensible to our limited neurology. The tactile sense (or, ultimately, any of our senses) can be used in the same manner to derive potential information about the nature of value. "Not knowing" by itself is not the same as "not knowing" + "receiving sensory indications." Pain and suffering feel bad -- and "bad," by definition, is something to be corrected for the same reasons that a circle, by definition, is round; whether or not it's actually bad and our perceptions are correct is irrelevant to our limited sphere of deduction and action potential.
"The acceptability and possibility of two things are both described by propositions and fundamentally, there's no difference between a proposition that describes some property of the universe and one that describes the acceptability of an action in the universe."
Until some alternative to reflexive mechanisms of interaction presents itself, I don't see how ignoring what those mechanisms are ostensibly attempting to tell us is acceptable. If my nervous system says, "This is bad," then I could in turn claim that the phenomenon in question isn't, but I'd be claiming this based on no lead or indication whatsoever; sensory information can act as, at the very minimum, a potential lead.
You'll need to justify yourself if you're going to claim that it's okay to not follow potential leads. The existence of two potential actions of equal uncertainty does not necessitate that both actions are equally attractive as prospects.
"But the validity of the denial of meaning of propositions isn't subject to those axioms for the denial itself precipitated out of rejecting those axioms."
ReplyDeleteThis assumes that data sets are closed or "complete." What if it turns out that meaning does, in fact, exist -- as our senses would have us believe -- and that there is a reasonable way to determine this in the future? Repudiating this possibility is just another form of absolutist mentality, founded on nothing but presumption and the desire for all actions to be equal. We may know nothing at all, and the state of meaning in the universe is no exception to this.
"If both statements are equally meaningful, than in my mind, neither statement is meaningful at all."
I don't know whether they are equally meaningful, and would never claim one way or the other without absolute, god-like knowledge on my side. However, I have sensory leads which tell me that one statement is more meaningful than the other, so I'll go with them, because I have to go with something.
"When I encounter the fundamental failure of epistemology, it's not enough to simply cast it aside simply because it's convenient to do so."
It's not just convenient; the alternative appears impossible for human beings (for the time being).
"Regarding your earlier contention that my position was genetically motivated, did it not occur to you that the extent to which mine is as such, yours is much more so?"
My position is biologically motivated, but not "genetically motivated"; by this, I mean that I cannot entirely transcend my biological state (nor can any other sentient organism), so I must necessarily pay attention to the issues which plague myself and the other life like me. However, I would never advocate the perpetuation of genes into the future based on my current understanding of the process of biological evolution. We don't appear capable of looking at reality from "beyond" our senses, but we DO appear capable of affecting the destinies of genomes.
No offense, but I'm all too aware of the malaise that has overtaken modern society, and of the mechanisms regularly concocted to the end of justifying it in the face of uncertainty, desire, etc. Your position, while well-argued, is fundamentally the same as any other position that man is powerless in life -- an axiom that, to me, smacks of weakness, complacency, or just plain laziness, depending on the presenter.
At this point, I think that we've both presented our cases rather thoroughly. You may post as many follow-up comments to this one as you like, but I think that enough information exists in this comments section for anyone passing by to make up their minds. I may respond in the future, but I can't guarantee this, as redundancy is quick to present itself in cases like these, and I can already see it to some extent here. If you're interested in a related topic, then we can talk about that instead, but in any case, even if you disagree now, perhaps you'll take this all into consideration as your life progresses; I'll do the same with your argument in the meantime.
“At this point, I think that we've both presented our cases rather thoroughly. You may post as many follow-up comments to this one as you like, but I think that enough information exists in this comments section for anyone passing by to make up their minds.”
ReplyDeleteFor once, concurred. While I could just as well attack, in depth, every point you've made here, it seems as though the time has come for some concluding remarks. Based on my understanding of everything you've written here, our positions are arguably very conceptually similar; the difference reducible to the layers of assumptions employed. While my stance arises naturally out of some fairly nihilistic leanings, yours takes this and added notions of pragmatism, intuition, reasonableness too arrive at a place where actions are to some extent justified. Nonetheless, I concede that I in other contexts often take such notions for granted.
The similarity in our contentions should go a long way to explain why I'll presumably remain unconvinced by your arguments. But of course, I never argued in the expectation that I would ever be swayed to the dark side. Rather, I argued because doing so not only forces me to clarify the concepts of my own position in my own mind but also to provide insights into the way others can construct arguments on a wide range of premises. But less formally, I was also arguing for the sake of arguing and do and will continue to do so against anyone for any reason.
Zralytylen out.
You seem to possess a fairly accurate picture of my stance, so it isn't as though you're not understanding my arguments, making my previous statement doubly necessary, I think. There is no more for me to explain to you, because you already understand it, even if you disagree with it.
ReplyDeleteI also never argued under the pretense of persuasion, and never do; like you, I argue to strengthen my own stance through practice.
I think that's an adequate summation for now.
I support the elimination of this blog.
ReplyDelete